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INTRODUCTION
There is a common misperception among charity1 leaders and the
public that public charities are prohibited from lobbying and
legislative activities. Nothing could be further from the truth. As
discussed more fully below, section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue
Code does restrict the amount of lobbying that charities can do by
prohibiting a charity qualifying for exemption from federal income
tax under that provision from engaging in legislative activities as a
“substantial part” of its activities.2 Section 170(c)(2)(D) contains a
similar restriction for organizations eligible to receive tax-deductible
contributions.3 But charities making an election under section 501(h)
1 “Charity” refers to all organizations defined in sections 501(c)(3) and 509(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”). I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 509(a) (2006).
2 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Section 501(a) exempts from income tax, inter alia, organizations
described in section 501(c)(3):

Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation, organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports
competition (but only if no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise provided in
subsection (h)), and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.
Id.
3 I.R.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). Section 170(c) defines “charitable contribution” as “a
contribution or gift to or for the use of,” inter alia, the following:

(2) A corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation—
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are not subject to the “substantial part” test (“Substantial Part Test”).4
Rather, organizations electing under 501(h) can engage in certain
lobbying activity to the extent of specified limits, which are expressed
solely in terms of dollar amounts.5 Section 501(h) permits eligible
organizations to elect the “expenditure test” (“Expenditure Test”) as a
substitute for the Substantial Part Test.6 In fact, charities that make
the 501(h) election can engage in extensive legislative activities,
almost without limitation, if the lobbying is properly structured.
Confusion over the lobbying limitations imposed by both the
Substantial Part Test and the Expenditure Test, rather than any real
and substantive limits on lobbying by public charities, actually limits
legislative activity by charities. This, in turn, limits the unique
benefits that public charities can provide to society.
This Article first explores the Substantial Part Test and the
Expenditure Test, focusing on their basic structures and the legislative
history surrounding the enactment of each test. The next Part
examines the policy reasons for permitting public charities to lobby
without restriction7 and notes the lack of convincing policy
explanations for the restrictions contained in the Code.
The Article concludes that the restrictions on lobbying under
501(c)(3) are ambiguous, confusing, and ineffective. Indeed, most

(A) created or organized in the United States or in any possession thereof,
or under the law of the United States, any State, the District of Columbia,
or any possession of the United States;
(B) organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals;
(C) no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual; and
(D) which is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3)
by reason of attempting to influence legislation, and which does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any
candidate for public office.
I.R.C. § 170(c).
4 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (noting that the Substantial Part Test applies except as otherwise
provided in subsection (h)).
5 I.R.C. § 501(h)(1), (2).
6 I.R.C. § 501(h)(3).
7 Permitting private foundations to engage in legislative speech would not achieve the
same goals. Accordingly, legislative activity is and should remain a taxable expenditure for
private foundations under section 4945 but subject to the liberal rules of Treasury Regulation §
53.4945. See discussion regarding private foundations infra Part IV.A.1.
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charities electing the Expenditure Test under section 501(h) can lobby
extensively, provided that the charity properly structures its lobbying
to take advantage of the liberal rules and definitions under section
501(h) and utilizes “cheap” methods of lobbying. Given the benefits
of increased and improved legislative discourse through lobbying by
charities and the inefficacy and innate complexity of the restrictions
on lobbying, section 501(c)(3) should be amended to permit unlimited
legislative activities by all public charities. As a distant second
choice, this Article suggests improving and simplifying the
Expenditure Test and making it the default test for legislative
activities by public charities.
I. THE SUBSTANTIAL PART TEST
The Substantial Part Test, derived from the language of section
501(c)(3), is the standard used to measure the lobbying activity of
most public charities.8 Section 501(c)(3) provides that organizations
organized and operated for certain specified purposes will be entitled
to exemption from federal income tax if, inter alia, “no substantial
part of the [organization’s] activities . . . is carrying on propaganda, or
otherwise attempting, to influence legislation (except as otherwise
provided in subsection (h)) . . . .”9 Accordingly, the Substantial Part
Test causes an organization to lose its exemption (and incur an excise
tax) if a “substantial part” of the organization’s activities consist of
carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence
legislation.10 An organization that fails the Substantial Part Test
becomes an action organization, and is deemed not to be operated
exclusively for exempt purposes.11 Organizations that forfeit
exemption for flunking the Substantial Part Test also are subject to an
excise or penalty tax in an amount equal to 5 percent of lobbying
expenditures incurred in the year that exemption is lost.12 Managers
also may be subject to penalty taxes.13 A 501(c)(3) organization is
subject to the Substantial Part Test unless it affirmatively elects the
8 More than 90 percent of public charities remain subject to the Substantial Part Test.
CLPI Public Policy Positions: IRS Rules Governing Charitable Lobbying, CENTER FOR
LOBBYING IN THE PUB. INT., www.clpi.org/protect-advocacy-rights/clpipublicpolicy (last visited
Apr. 9, 2012). But see infra notes 142, 147–148 and accompanying discussion, which suggests
that less than 2 percent of eligible organizations have actually made the § 501(h) election.
9 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
10 These rules do not apply to organizations that have made an election under section
501(h). Id.
11 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2008).
12 I.R.C. § 4912(a). Organizations that make the election under section 501(h), churches
and their affiliates, and private foundations are not subject to the excise tax. I.R.C. § 4912(c)(2).
13 I.R.C. § 4912(b).
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Expenditure Test.14 In other words, the Substantial Part Test is the
default test for determining whether an organization has engaged in
excessive lobbying.
The Substantial Part Test is an entirely subjective test. No one,
including the Internal Revenue Service (“Service” or “IRS”), knows
when lobbying becomes “substantial.”15 Courts (and presumably the
IRS as well) generally make the determination of substantiality by
applying a balancing, or facts-and-circumstances, test.16 The results
are both imprecise and inconsistent.17 Although a few early cases
attempted to devise a quantitative test,18 more recently, courts have
opted for a more subjective balancing test under which all of the facts
and circumstances are weighed “in the context of the objectives and
circumstances of the organization.”19 This balancing test is no more
than a “smell test”; it is quite vague and provides almost no guidance
to an organization wishing to influence legislation in furtherance of
its exempt purposes without jeopardizing its exempt status.
In addition to absence of clarity on the concept of substantiality,
critical concepts and terms are undefined under the Substantial Part
Test. Even the term “lobbying” is not well defined. The Substantial
Part Test fails even to address consistently the fundamental question
of what activities lobbying is to be measured against.20
The most significant danger of the vagueness in the Substantial
Part Test is its propensity to scare charities into non-activity on the
legislative front with its lack of direction and guidance and the

14 See infra Part II (discussing Expenditure Test); I.R.C. § 501(h) (providing the
Expenditure Test).
15 Melaney Partner, acting director of the IRS’ Exempt Organizations Customer Education
and Outreach office, concludes that the Substantial Part Test option is a “more subjective
method compared to the more mathematical, objective expenditure test.” How to Lose Your
501(c)(3) Tax Exempt Status (Without Really Trying), INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/how_to_lose_your_tax_exempt_status.pdf (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
Under this test, whether an organization’s activities are “substantial part” of its overall activities
is determined by taking into account “all of the pertinent facts and circumstances.” Id.
16 See, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 855
(10th Cir. 1972) (noting that the “political activities of an organization must be balanced . . . to
determine whether a substantial part of its activities” consisted of lobbying).
17 See Laura Brown Chisolm, Political Advocacy Meets the Internal Revenue Code:
“There’s Got to Be a Better Way” 16 (1994) (unpublished manuscript) (presented at N.Y.U.
National Center on Philanthropy & Law Conference on Nonprofit Speech: Lobbying & Political
Campaign
Activities),
available
at
http://www1.law.nyu.edu/ncpl/pdfs/1994/COnf1994Chisolmpaper.pdf (noting the “imprecise
and inconsistent interpretation by the I.R.S. and the courts” of the substantial part test).
18 One court held that devoting less than 5 percent of an organization’s “time and effort”
to lobbying is insubstantial. Seasongood v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 907, 912 (6th Cir. 1955).
19 Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1142 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
20 See Chisolm, supra note 17, at 16–17 (noting various approaches to measuring the
substantiality of an organization’s lobbying).
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severity of its penalty.21 Furthermore, the lack of clarity in the
Substantial Part Test may actually provide flexibility for charities not
interested in compliance to circumvent limitations on lobbying. The
Subcommittee on Oversight suggested in 1987 that “the opportunities
for some exempt organizations to circumvent the law today are too
numerous.”22 It said of the Substantial Part Test:
[T]he penalty that generally exists for violation of these rules
and restrictions by a tax-exempt organization, i.e., revocation
of an organization’s tax-exempt status, is often inappropriate
and ineffective and can have little deterrent effect. For those
organizations deeply concerned about being in complete
compliance of the law, the lack of clear guidelines coupled
with the threat of the revocation sanction may inhibit many
organizations from engaging in even permissible activities.23
As the two men with primary responsibility for drafting and
reviewing the 1988 Treasury regulations promulgated under section
501(h) surmised, “the Subcommittee found that the statutory and
regulatory provisions governing lobbying by charities fail to deter
abusers, but do deter nonabusers.”24 Both Congress and Treasury
evidently were aware of the shortcomings of the Substantial Part Test
and its negative impact on the voice of the charitable sector.
A. What We Can Surmise from the Legislative History
The Substantial Part Test was added to the Code in 1934.25 The
rationale for its introduction is unclear, and the legislative history is

21 See Laura B. Chisolm, Exempt Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the
Rationales, 63 IND. L.J. 201, 244–246 (1987) (arguing that the level of under-guided IRS
discretion to impose sanctions is inappropriate and creates the potential for abuse as a political
tool); see generally Richard L. Haight, Lobbying for the Public Good: Limitations on
Legislative Activities by Section 501(c)(3) Organizations, 23 GONZ. L. REV. 77 (1987)
(analyzing the limitations on lobbying, their imprecisions, and the resulting penalties, and
suggesting a cautious approach to lobbying activities); see also S. REP. NO. 91–552, at 47
(1969) (noting that “the standards as to the permissible level of [lobbying] activities under
present law are so vague as to encourage subjective application of the sanction”).
22 Findings And Recommendations Of Ways And Means Oversight Subcommittee On
Federal Tax Rules Governing Lobbying, Political Activities, Submitted To Way And Means
Committee, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 111, at J–21 (June 11, 1987).
23 Id.
24 Paul G. Accettura et al., The Revised Lobbying Regulations—A Difficult Balance, 41
TAX NOTES 1425, 1434 (1988). The authors of this paper are James J. McGovern, the Assistant
Chief Counsel (Employee Benefits and Exempt Organizations), Office of Chief Counsel,
Internal Revenue Service, Paul G. Accettura, an Assistant Branch Chief, and Jerome P. Walsh
Skelly, a senior attorney, in 1987. Id. at 1425.
25 Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–216, § 23(o), 48 Stat. 680, 690 (1934).
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sparse.26 Both the available legislative history and its sparseness,
however, may be instructive as to congressional intent.27
There appears to have been little initial controversy among Senate
Finance Committee members when the idea of limiting the ability of
charities to lobby was first introduced at a committee meeting on
March 21, 1934. In contrast to many of the other motions passed that
day, Committee Chairman Pat Harrison’s motion that, “no deductions
from gross income should be allowed in the case of contributions
made to organizations carrying on propaganda, attempting to
influence legislation or participating in partisan politics” passed
without requiring even a “record vote” and was not debated.28 This
apparent ease of passage is particularly noteworthy because the
motion appears far broader than the eventual codified language.29
Harrison’s motion seems to imply that there would be no deduction
for an organization “carrying on” any lobbying activities.30
The gap in the legislative history between introduction and vote is
somewhat surprising. By the time the amendment had been submitted
to the entire House of Representatives on April 2, 1934, language
specifying that disqualification would occur only where a “substantial
part” of an organization’s activities were lobbying-related had been
added to the amendment.31 Senator Harrison may not, however, have
considered this language significant to his motion in committee, as he
introduced a large group of the Finance Committee’s amendments on
the floor (including the new “no substantial part” language) by stating
that “there are many amendments which it seems to me we can
dispose of this afternoon as to which there is no controversy.”32
Senator David Reed, another member of the Senate Finance
Committee,33 however, either had registered some dissent in
committee that is not noted in the minutes or had a change of heart
between the committee’s vote and the amendment’s introduction on
the floor, as he created the controversy that Harrison did not

26 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, What Is This “Lobbying” That We Are So Worried About?,
26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 485, 500 (2008) (noting the “very limited” legislative history).
27 Much of the legislative history summary derives from an excellent memorandum on the
topic prepared by research assistant Daniel Schumeister in the summer of 2010.
28 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 73RD CONG., MINUTES ON REVENUE ACT OF 1934
110, 112 (March 21, 1934).
29 See Revenue Act of 1934 § 23(o) (prohibiting lobbying only when it becomes a
substantial part of an organization’s activities).
30 See MINUTES ON REVENUE ACT OF 1934, supra note 28, at 112.
31 See 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (showing the introduction of the amendment).
32 Id. at 5860 (statement of Sen. Harrison).
33 See Mayer, supra note 26, at 500 (noting that Senator Reed was the “ranking member
of the Senate Finance Committee”).
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anticipate.34 According to Harrison’s initial explanation on the floor,
the amendment was to “apply to any organization that is receiving
contributions, the proceeds of which are to be used for propaganda
purposes or to try to influence legislation.”35 Senator Reed agreed
with Harrison’s assessment of the bill’s purpose and claimed that the
amendment fought against “selfish” donations to organizations that
were advancing the “personal interests” of the donor.36 Yet, even at
this early stage—during the initial floor debates—the difficulty in
adequately defining “substantial part” became clear, as Reed noted
that the amendment’s language was too broad, going “much further
than the committee intended to go.”37
Upon reconsideration of the amendment two days later, the
congressmen and draftsmen were unable to formulate any more
accurate language to accomplish the “impossible task” 38 of wording
the amendment.39 Reed again expressed his dismay at the
amendment’s language, claiming that neither the Senate Finance
Committee nor the “drafting counsel” was satisfied with the end
product.40 Both Couzens and Reed agreed that the language could be
changed in the Conference Committee.41 In the end, however, the
“substantial part” language of the amendment did not change in
conference aside from removing “participation in partisan politics” as
a category of restricted action.42 Nor does any alternative to the
“substantial part” language appear in the conference report.43
Analysis of the limited legislative history can lead us to some
concrete conclusions. Given that some legislative activity is permitted
under the Substantial Part Test, Congress must have concluded that
34 His vacillations may have had to do with a personal feud with the National Economy
League, a non-profit. See Oliver A. Houck, On the Limits of Charity: Lobbying, Litigation, and
Electoral Politics by Charitable Organizations Under the Internal Revenue Code and Related
Laws, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 16–23 (2003) (chronicling Senator Reed’s feud with the National
Economy League).
35 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (statement of Sen. Harrison).
36 Id. (statement of Sen. Reed).
37 Id. Foreshadowing the decades of uncertainty to follow, Senator Couzens asked
whether various types of organizations would pass the test. Id. Reed simply responded that he
was “not so sure.” Id. The amendment was then passed over for later discussion. Id.
38 Id. (statement of Sen. Reed).
39 See 78 CONG. REC. 5959 (1934) (acknowledging the remaining imprecision and
potential and the likely need for further revision).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Vaughn E. James, The African-American Church, Political Activity, and Tax
Exemption, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 381 (2007) (quoting Lobbying and Political Activities
of Tax-Exempt Orgs.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 100th Cong. 124, 139 (1987) (statement of William J. Lehrfeld)).
43 DOUGHTON, TO PROVIDE REVENUE, EQUALIZE TAXATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,
H.R. Rep. No. 73–1385, at 3–4 (1934).
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lobbying by charities can produce public benefit. A journey deeper
into the scarce legislative history confirms that Congress did not
believe that legislative activity could not co-exist with charitable
purpose, since Congress did not ban lobbying by charities
altogether.44 The “no substantial part” language was added to the
Code in the Revenue Act of 1934, without congressional hearings on
the topic.45
According to floor statements by one Senator, the intent in adding
the “substantial part” language to section 501(c)(3) was to deny a
deduction for contributions that were used to influence legislation
because such contributions were “selfish” and “made to advance the
personal interests of the giver of the money.”46 No additional
illumination of the Substantial Part Test can be derived from the
legislative history to the Revenue Act of 1934, leading us to deduce
only that Congress concluded (1) some legislative activity can coexist with and further the exempt purposes of a public charity,47 (2)
“selfish” lobbying (i.e., lobbying that promotes the individual
interests of its leaders rather than the interests of the public it serves)
could not further the exempt purposes of a public charity, and (3)
charities should be permitted to engage in non-selfish legislative
activity to further their charitable purposes. There is no indication,
however, as to why that non-selfish legislative activity should be
restricted or limited in any way. Congress’s goals might have been
better achieved by proscribing “selfish” lobbying but allowing
unlimited non-selfish legislative activity by charities.48
The history of the 1934 legislation does not support any sort of
limitation on non-selfish lobbying by public charities. Furthermore,
there are other sorts of checks on the activities of public charities that
make selfish lobbying unlikely. For example, the inurement and
private benefit restrictions would provide sufficient penalty to quell
lobbying that might benefit personally those in charge of the
44 See Mayer, supra note 26, at 500 (concluding that Congress believed lobbying by
charities should be restricted to prevent abuses, not prohibited outright).
45 See Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–216, § 101(6), 48 Stat. 680, 700 (1934). The
provision was enacted as part of the Supplemental Provisions of the Revenue Act of 1934.
46 78 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934) (statement of Sen. Reed). Senator Byron P. Harrison noted
that “there are certain organizations which are receiving contributions in order to influence
legislation and carry out propaganda. The committee thought there ought to be an amendment
which would stop that, so that is why we have put this amendment in the bill.” Id. at 5959
(statement of Sen. Harrison).
47 See also Revenue Act of 1934: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934).
48 Arguably Congress did this in 1969 when it enacted section 4945, which effectively
prohibits private foundations from lobbying, although some would argue that they have gone
too far. See discussion regarding private foundations infra Part IV.A.1.
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organization.49 In addition, the requirement that charities be
“organized and operated exclusively” for certain charitable purposes50
precludes substantial lobbying that does not support those purposes.
More effective, perhaps, are the strictures imposed by the public
accountability of the charities. In other words, public charities are
dependent on the public and government for funding and support.51 If
their legislative activities do not further the public purposes supported
by their funders and the purchasers of their goods and services, they
will lose support and suffer economic, reputational, and other
consequences.52 This reliance on the public decreases the risk that
public charities will engage in selfish lobbying, further indicating that

49 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(2)–(3) (as amended in 2008);
see also Jill S. Manny, Nonprofit Payments to Insiders and Outsiders: Is the Sky the Limit?, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 745–46 (2007) (discussing the difference between the private benefit
and private inurement restrictions).
50 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Treasury Regulations § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(1), provide that, in order to
be exempt, an organization must engage “primarily in activities which accomplish one or more
of . . . exempt purposes specified in section 501(c)(3).” (emphasis added).
51 Although from 1950 onwards there developed a trend of deepening distrust of private
foundations, a 1965 Treasury report illuminated many of the positive aspects of private
foundations:

Private philanthropic organizations can possess important characteristics which
modern government necessarily lacks. They may be many-centered, free of
administrative superstructure, subject to the readily exercised control of individuals
with widely diversified views and interests. Such characteristics give these
organizations great opportunity to initiate thought and action, to experiment with
new and untried ventures, to dissent from prevailing attitudes, and to act quickly and
flexibly. Precisely because they can be initiated and controlled by a single person or
a small group, they may evoke great intensity of interest and dedication of energy.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FINANCE, 89th CONG., TREASURY DEPARTMENT REPORT ON
PRIVATE FOUNDATIONS 12 (Comm. Print 1965). This report also identified a limited number of
instances in which private foundations engaged in self-dealing. Id. at 15–23. Congress seems to
have latched on to the more negative aspects of the report, and using the report as evidence of
the potential and actual problems with private foundations, enacted greater restrictions on
private foundations in 1969. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE
TAXATION, 91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 51
(1970) (discussing the additional requirements for private foundations); 115 CONG. REC.
37,197–204 (1969) (hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969) (noting the abuses of private
foundations) ; H.R. Rep. No. 91–418, pt. 1, at 19 (1969) (discussing the creation of a minimal
tax on the investment income of private foundations, in part, because of the perceived need for
“vigorous and extensive administration . . . in order to provide appropriate assurances that
private foundations will promptly and properly use their funds for charitable purposes”); see
generally Leif M. Clark, Comment, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16
HOUS. L. REV. 480 (1979) (examining the rationale and application of the political activities
limitation as applied to churches).
52 Both United Way and the Red Cross have seen contributions drop following scandals.
See Robert Strauss, Accountability; They’re Mad as Hell, and They’re Not Making Donations
Anymore,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Nov
17,
2003,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/17/giving/accountability-they-re-mad-as-hell-and-they-re-notmaking-donations-anymore.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.

5/16/2012 12:43:26 PM

2012]

NONPROFIT LEGISLATIVE SPEECH

767

the restrictions on lobbying for public charities are unnecessary and
ill-advised.
B. IRS and Treasury Illumination
Given the vagueness of the Substantial Part Test and the severity
of the penalty for failing it, one would expect Treasury or the IRS to
provide some helpful direction. IRS and Treasury guidance, however,
has been relatively ineffective in providing a roadmap for compliance
with the Substantial Part Test.
According to the IRS, the Substantial Part Test is one “determined
on the basis of all the pertinent facts and circumstances in each
case.”53 The IRS has held that an organization whose “primary
objective” can only be accomplished through lobbying would not be
eligible for 501(c)(3) status.54 Nonetheless, this statement provides no
guidance in determining what part of an organization’s activities
would constitute a “substantial part” or which factors to weigh in
making the determination. The line remains blurry and perplexing.
Treasury regulations defining “action organizations”55 for purposes
of the operational test lead us to a similarly mystifying place. An
“action organization” is not “operated exclusively” for exempt
purposes,56 but the definition of “action organization” is anything but
clear. “Action organization” is defined in two, equally unhelpful
ways, both of which require line drawing without a legislative or
regulatory ruler. To determine whether an organization falls within
the definition we must determine either (1) that a “substantial part of
its activities is attempting to influence legislation by propaganda or
53 Measuring
Lobbying: Substantial Part Test, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
http://www.irs.gov/charities/article/0,,id=163393,00.html (last updated July 20, 2011). The
Exempt Organizations Handbook, explains the “no substantial part” test:

[T]here is no simple rule as to what amount of activities is substantial . . . . Most
cases have tended to avoid any attempt at percentage measurement of activities . . . .
The central problem is more often one of characterizing the various attempts to
influence legislation. Once this determination is made, substantiality is frequently
self-evident.
Exempt Organizations Handbook, 4. Int. Rev. Man.-Admin. (CCH) § 394 [hereinafter
Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test].
54 See Rev. Rul. 62–71, 1962–1 C.B. 85 (holding that an organization primarily engaged
in teaching and advocating the adoption of a particular real estate taxation theory did not qualify
for 501(c)(3) exemption because it was an action organization, i.e., its primary objective could
only be accomplished by the enactment of legislation); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–
1(c)(3) (as amended in 2008) (defining “action” organizations, which are by definition not
operated exclusively for exempt purposes).
55 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3). This regulation states, in part, that “An organization
is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if it is an action organization . . . .”
Id. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(i).
56 Id. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(i).
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otherwise,”57 or (2) “its main or primary objective or objectives . . .
may be attained only by legislation or a defeat of proposed
legislation.”58 For the second test, the regulations suggest considering
“all the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the articles
and all activities of the organization . . . .”59 Nowhere in these two
tests does Treasury provide guidance on which measurements to use
or which factors to weigh in making a determination. As one
commentator explains, “it is unclear whether this determination is
based on the level of activity measured, for example, by time spent, or
expenditures, or both. In addition, there is no guidance as to how
much activity, however computed, constitutes a substantial part of the
organization’s activities.”60
The lack of effective guidance from IRS and Treasury, combined
with the threat of loss of exemption for crossing an invisible line,
inevitably scares many charities into inactivity in the realm of
legislative matters. It is hard to imagine, from available legislative
history, that Congress ever intended this result.
C. Hints from the Courts
Just as there is little in the way of guidance from the legislative
history, the IRS, and Treasury, the judicial record in interpreting the
“substantial part” test is remarkably vague.61 Indeed, only four or five
cases generally are cited in interpreting the test.62 Furthermore, as has
been widely noted, the existing case law reveals anything but a clear,
predictable doctrine surrounding the Substantial Part Test; just the
opposite is true. In 1955, the Sixth Circuit held, in Seasongood v.
Commissioner,63 that 5 percent of an organization’s expenditures did
not reach the level of “substantial” and reversed the IRS’s revocation
of an organization’s 501(c)(3) status.64 In Christian Echoes National
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(ii).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c)(3)(iv).
59 Id.
60 FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS §
5.03[3] (2005).
61 See id. (observing that the limited judicial precedents “do not resolve most of the
significant issues”).
62 See id. (analyzing the four commonly cited cases addressing the “substantial part” test);
Brian Galle, The LDS Church, Proposition 8, and the Federal Law of Charities, 103 NW. U. L.
REV.
COLLOQUY
370,
372
(2009),
available
at
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/lawreview/Colloquy/2009/10 (discussing the unclear
case law in this area); Miriam Galston, Lobbying and the Public Interest: Rethinking the
Internal Revenue Code’s Treatment of Legislative Activities, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1269, 1279 n.25
(1993) (same); see generally Chisolm, supra note 17 (generally discussing the imprecision of
the law and cases addressing this area of law).
63 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
64 Id. at 912. But see Lord’s Day Alliance of Pa. v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 62, 65 (E.D.
57
58
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Ministry, Inc. v. United States,65 the Tenth Circuit declined to follow
the developing certainty of the Sixth Circuit’s “percentage test,” and,
instead, balanced “the political activities of the organization” within
“the context of the objectives and circumstances of the organization,”
upholding a revocation of exemption for this and other reasons.66 In
League of Women Voters of United States v. United States,67 the
Court of Claims focused only on the amount of time the
organization’s staff spent on lobbying activities in reaching its
conclusion.68 Finally, in 1975 in Haswell v. United States,69 the Court
of Claims attempted to find a middle ground between the objective
numbers of a percentage-based test and the subjectivity of a
“significance of activities test,” noting both the organization’s
percentage of expenditures spent on lobbying as well as the relative
primacy of lobbying to the organization’s activities.70 Unfortunately,
the court did not explain how it arrived at its determination of the
significance of the organization’s lobbying activities, nor has that
court, or any court, considered a “substantial part” test claim since
then.71
In essence, courts have applied a moving-target approach to both
critical definitions and the measuring rods for substantiality of
legislative activity. This judicial inconsistency leaves the charitable
sector with no notion of either what constitutes substantial legislative
activity or which factors to weigh in measuring substantiality. Given
the severity of the penalty (loss of exemptions) for foot-faults over an
invisible and unidentifiable line, the response of inaction in the realm
of legislative activities is predictable.
II. THE EXPENDITURE TEST
In 1976, Congress enacted section 501(h), which established an
elective standard for determining whether a public charity’s
legislative activities qualify as insubstantial.72 Section 501(h) is an
Pa. 1946) (holding that the legislative activities were “minor” because the activities “occurred
only when the Legislature was in session, four or five months biennially”).
65 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
66 Id. at 855; see also HILL & MANCINO, supra note 60 § 5.03[3] (discussing the
significance of the Christian Echoes holding).
67 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 822 (1960).
68 Id. at 383 (holding that lobbying was the main reason for the League’s formation).
69 500 F.2d 1133.
70 Id. at 1145–47 (dismissing the plaintiff’s case based on its finding of fact that the
organization’s activities were political in nature).
71 See HILL & M ANCINO, supra note 60 § 5.03[3] (“It is unclear how the court determined
the extent of the organization’s activities.”).
72 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 1520, 1720 (1976).
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elective safe harbor provision. Specifically, it provides an election for
certain 501(c)(3) organizations73 that permits them to engage in
legislative activity up to statutorily specified limits, which are
expressed solely in terms of dollar amounts.74 Section 501(h) permits
eligible organizations to elect the Expenditure Test as a substitute for
the Substantial Part Test, making the Substantial Part Test, in effect,
the default test for measuring lobbying activities.
Unlike the subjective Substantial Part Test, the Expenditure Test is
quite objective. It draws vivid lines for charitable lobbying framed
entirely in terms of dollar amounts.75 Charities electing the
Expenditure Test to delineate their lobbying limitations are able to
pinpoint precisely how much they can spend on various types of
communications intended to impact legislation without incurring
either an intermediate or the ultimate sanction. Furthermore,
significant terms and concepts that remained undefined and
inconsistently interpreted under the Substantial Part Test are now
clearly defined by statute and in Treasury regulations.76
A. Legislative History
The Expenditure Test is best viewed as a legislative fix to the
vagueness of the Substantial Part Test. Legislative history to the 1976
Act, while not abundant, is more robust and clarifying than the
discussion surrounding the addition of the “substantial part” language
to the Code in 1934. The legislative history from 197677 indicates five
primary purposes for the enactment of the Expenditure Test. First,
section 501(h) was intended to eliminate the vagueness of the
Substantial Part Test by defining substantiality in objective terms. 78
Second, the provision addressed the concern that large organizations
would be less restricted than small organizations by the Substantial
Part Test and thus able to lobby more extensively than smaller
organizations because the larger organizations could afford to form
73 All public charities other than private foundations and churches may make the election.
I.R.C. § 501(h)(3)–(5) (2006).
74 I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)–(2) (establishing dollar value ceilings on “lobbying expenditures”
and “grass roots expenditures”); I.R.C. § 4911 (imposing tax on charities that make excessive
expenditures to affect legislation).
75 I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)–(2).
76 The helpful terms and concepts adopted for the Expenditure Test explicitly do not apply
to the Substantial Part Test. I.R.C. § 501(h)(7); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)–1(a)(4).
77 Special thanks to research assistant Daniel Schumeister for his thorough review of this
legislative history. Much of the analysis is based on his description of this history in a memo
dated August 20, 2010.
78 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, pt. 1, at 8 (1976) (noting that the addition of 501(h) was
“designed to set relatively specific expenditure limits to replace the uncertain standards of
present law ”); S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt. 2, at 80 (1976) (same).
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and fund organizations described in section 501(c)(4) that could lobby
extensively or even exclusively.79 Third, Congress appeared to be
concerned about the harshness of the ultimate sanction of loss of
exemption as the penalty for violating the vague Substantial Part Test,
particularly in light of the potentially greater risk of confronting that
penalty for smaller organizations.80 Responding to this concern,
section 4911 provides for an intermediate sanction in lieu of and in
addition to an ultimate sanction for excessive lobbying expenditures
under the Expenditure Test.81 Fourth, the House Report indicated that
a more objective and clearly defined standard would enable the
Service to more properly enforce the limitation on legislative
activities imposed under section 501(c)(3).82 Fifth, Congress was
interested in creating parity in the Code between the nonprofit sector
and the for-profit sector in access to Congress.83 As made clear by an
American Bar Association Report, legislators “need information”
from the nonprofit lobby just as they need it from the business sector,
and the Expenditure Test would tend to restore the balance between
for-profit and non-profit lobbying influence.84
The path to the addition of section 501(h) to the Code was a long
and winding road through a stop-and-start maze. The bill that
ultimately passed, H.R. 13500, was the product of a 1968 ABA
report, nine different legislative proposals over a six year period, and
attention by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public
Needs, known as the Filer Commission, after its chair, John H. Filer.85
79 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, pt. 1, at 8 (“Some organizations (particularly organizations
which have already built up large endowments) can split up their activities between a lobbying
organization and a charitable organization.”); S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt. 2, at 80 (same).
Organizations described in I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) are exempt from federal income tax under I.R.C. §
501(a) and are operated for the promotion of social welfare. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(4). A 501(c)(4)
organization may further its purposes through lobbying as its primary or only activity without
jeopardizing its exempt status but is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions under
I.R.C. § 170(c). I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501(c)(4).
80 See H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, pt. 1, at 8 (citing concern that smaller organizations
incapable of splitting their activities between lobbying and charitable organizations, loss of
501(c)(3) status would constitute a “severe blow to the organization”); S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt.
2, at 80 (same); see, e.g., Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849,
856 (1972) (revoking 501(c)(3) status of a religious organization engaged in lobbying activities
under the substantial part test).
81 See I.R.C. § 4911 (imposing a tax on excess lobbying expenditures).
82 H.R. REP. NO. 94–1210, at 8.
83 See Influencing Legislation by Public Charities: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Ways and Means on H.R. 13500, 94th Cong. 65 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 13500]
(statement of Sherwin P. Simmons, President, American Bar Association) (presenting the ABA
view that charities “should be permitted to communicate directly with legislative bodies”).
84 Id.
85 See id. at 37–38 (discussing the history of H.R. 13,500 and referencing the findings of
the Filer Commission). The Filer Commission ultimately recommended that the lobbying
restrictions of section 501 should replicate those of section 162, stating that “nonprofit
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H.R. 13500 clearly was not a bill that simply slipped through the halls
of Congress and on to the President’s desk. Appropriately describing
an earlier bill,86 the lawyers at Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz
characterized the effort as one that “represents a compromise on a
compromise on a compromise on a compromise . . . .”87 Considering
that H.R. 13500 was the product of at least three more proposals and
two more years of compromise and discussion after those
compromises, the complexity of H.R. 13500’s passage is hard to
overstate.
A review of the legislative history indicates that the 1976 changes
in the Code were intended to encourage greater lobbying by the
nonprofit sector. The evidence also strongly suggests that the interests
of Congress and the independent sector were, in general, aligned in
moving towards a new lobbying rule, although each group had
distinct views on which reforms were necessary.
In 1969, Senator John Sherman Cooper made the first move in
Congress, as he introduced an amendment to the Tax Reform Act of
196988 following up on the ABA Resolution from earlier that year.89
Senator Cooper argued that Congress needed to ensure that it received
a “flow of information of the highest quality,” stating that “Senators
and Representatives can act wisely only if all sides of the issue are
aired before them.”90 Cooper, therefore, proposed to allow unlimited
lobbying, explicitly attempting to keep the tax treatment of nonprofits
in line with that of for-profit entities. He found it “disturbing” that
while 501(c)(3)’s lobbying activities were heavily restricted, other
Code sections provided a “tax stimulus” to for-profit businesses that
lobby by permitting them to deduct lobbying expenses.91 Notably,
however, Cooper would have forbidden all grassroots lobbying, or

organizations, other than foundations, [should] be allowed the same freedoms to attempt to
influence legislation as are business corporations and trade associations, that toward this end
Congress remove the current limitation on such activity by charitable groups eligible to receive
tax-deductible gifts.” COMM’N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY & PUB. NEEDS, GIVING IN
AMERICA: TOWARD A STRONGER VOLUNTARY SECTOR 181 (1975) (emphasis removed).
86 H.R. 12037, 93d Cong. (1st Sess. 1973).
87 Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz, Legislative Activities of Charitable Organizations Other
Than Private Foundations, with Addendum on Legislative Activities of Private Foundations, in
5 RESEARCH PAPERS SPONSORED BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND
PUBLIC NEEDS, 2917, 2928 (1977) [hereinafter Pepper, Hamilton Report].
88 H.R. 13270, 91st Cong. (1st Sess. 1969).
89 See Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37 (noting the introduction of the ABA
resolution).
90 115 CONG. REC. 29,426 (1969) (statement of Rep. John Cooper).
91 Id. This is no longer the case under current law. I.R.C. § 162(e).
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any attempts “to influence the general public or segments thereof with
respect to legislative matters, elections, or referendums.”92
Two years later, Senator Edmund Muskie93 and Congressman
James Symington94 simultaneously introduced bills devoted to
lobbying reform. Similar to Cooper’s amendment, the MuskieSymington bill was designed to provide parity between the treatment
of lobbying as provided by section 501(c)(3) and section 162.95
Introducing the bill, Muskie reiterated the desire for increased
nonprofit participation in the legislative process, claiming that it
“makes no sense to decide” that organizations operate in the public
interest and thus “grant them tax-exempt status” yet still “silence
them when they attempt to speak to those whom must decide public
policy.”96 Indeed, Senator Muskie noted, “[i]t is fundamental to our
constitutional system that they should have equal access along with
business groups and others in presenting views to Congress.”97
Muskie’s proposal, however, was not intended to permit unlimited
legislative activity by charities: only lobbying pertaining to
“legislation of direct interest to the organization” would be permitted,
and, as with Cooper’s proposal, grassroots lobbying would be
disallowed.98 Although there was “broad support” for the bill, “there
was some concern that it was too broad and that it might be
interpreted” to allow charities to focus on lobbying rather than other
“normal operations.”99 This attempt did not result in law.
Next, Senator Muskie and Senator Hugh Scott introduced a bill 100
“which had the same fundamental purpose but somewhat limited the
legislative activities in which charities might engage.”101 According to
attorneys at Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, the Muskie-Scott bills
limited legislative activities such that a 501(c)(3) organization had to
“‘normally’” devote “‘substantially more than one-half’” of its budget
to the function for which its exemption was granted.102 Though this
language sounds perilously similar to the vague “substantial part”
92 Id. at 29,427 (quotation omitted). Cooper would also have retained the prohibition on
involvement in political campaigns. Id.
93 S. 1408, 92d Cong. (1971).
94 H.R. 8920, 92d Cong. (1971).
95 See Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37 (observing that the MuskieSymington bills followed the characteristics of section 162(e)).
96 117 CONG. REC. 8517 (1971).
97 Id.
98 Id. at 8518.
99 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37.
100 S. 3063, 92d Cong. (1972).
101 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37.
102 See Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2926 (quoting S. 3063, 92d Cong. §
3(B) (1972)).
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terminology, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 intended to define
“normally” and “substantially more than one-half.”103
Next up was the Ullman-Schneebeli bill of March 9, 1972,104 an
effort that represented “[f]urther compromise and refinement.”105 The
Ullman-Schneebeli bill marked the first time a reform proposal
allowed for some amount of grassroots lobbying, and also held that
communication between an organization and its members intended to
spur those members to influence legislation would count towards the
organization’s lobbying quota.106 The bill also presaged H.R. 13500’s
use of an expenditure test that provided more stringent regulation of
grassroots lobbying than direct lobbying; it provided that while a
nonprofit could use 20 percent of its expenditures for general
lobbying, only 5 percent of total expenditures could be used for
grassroots lobbying.107 The Ullman-Schneebeli bill also for the first
time excluded certain types of legislative activity from the definition
of restricted lobbying, such as nonpartisan research, requested
technical assistance, and appearances directly related to the viability
of an organization’s tax-exempt status.108 This bill bears closer
resemblance to the legislation ultimately passed than earlier versions,
but a long road to passage still remained.
The Ullman-Schneebeli bill garnered “overwhelmingly favorable”
testimony during May 1972 hearings, but Treasury remained unhappy
with several of its provisions.109 Before the Ways and Means
Committee, Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax
Policy, indicated Treasury’s interest in modeling the new legislation
directly on section 162(e)’s allowable business deductions, and
permitting charity lobbying for matters “of direct interest.”110 Among
other hesitations, Cohen expressed concern that the limitations
provided by the Ullman-Schneebeli bill would allow “at least $1.5
billion [to] be expended on ‘grassroots’ lobbying.”111 Treasury
103 Id.
104 H.R.

13720, 92d Cong. (1972).
on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37. See also Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra
note 87, at 2926 (noting that the bill reflected “further compromise and considerable
refinement”).
106 See Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2926 (“This bill not only permitted
direct lobbying; it also permitted charities to undertake a limited amount of ‘grass roots’
activity.”).
107 Id.
108 Id. at 2926–27.
109 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 37.
110 Legislative Activity by Certain Types of Exempt Organizations: Hearings Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 92d Cong. 13 (1972) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 13720]
(statement of Edwin S. Cohen, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy).
111 Id. at 8.
105 Hearings
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believed organizations might develop large “slush funds.”112 The
charities, however, favored the specificity of the Expenditure Test.113
Next, competing bills were introduced in quick succession by
Senators Muskie and Scott114 and by the Ullman-Schneebeli team.115
The latter bill garnered more attention and support, as reported in the
Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz report discussing the Ullman-Schneebeli
bill:
This bill made some dramatic changes. It adopted a reverse
graduation feature to limit expenditures for direct lobbying.
This feature responded to the “slush fund” argument. The bill
then grouped all other lobbying activities together, thereby
including grass-roots activities with activities involving
communication between the organization and its members.
The bill proscribed all but an “insignificant” amount of such
activities. The bill also contained a penalty clause that in
effect fined charitable organizations which undertook
proscribed legislative activities in addition to revoking their
preferred status under section 501(c)(3). This provision was
inserted to protect against the possibility of a public charity
losing its section 501(c)(3) status with a large endowment
fund, created with tax-deductible dollars, that could then be
expended without limitation on lobbying activities.116
The independent sector was not, however, satisfied with this latest
bill: nonprofits initially objected to the penalty clause and believed
that by allowing only an “insignificant” amount of communication
between organizations and their members that was deemed lobbying,
112 See

Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2927 (citation and quotation omitted).
id. (“The charitable organizations, on the other hand, supported the bill’s
quantitative tests with its 20 percent – 5 percent feature. The tests were considerably more
specific than the substantiality test and could be easily translated into dollars.”).
114 S. 1036, 93d Cong. (1973).
115 H.R. 5095, 93d Cong. (1973).
116 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2927 (footnotes omitted). The report
continued:
113 See

Another feature of the Ullman-Schneebeli bill was a new provision relating to affiliated
organizations. This provision required that if two or more organizations are effectively
controlled, directly or indirectly, by the same person or persons, one of which was a section
501(c)(3) organization electing to have its lobbying activities regulated in accordance with the
amendment, the two organizations would be treated as one and the same for purposes of the bill.
Some such provision would appear to be required so long as a “reverse graduation” principle is
used.
The bill also had a provision relating to section 501(c)(4) organizations and a selfterminating provision.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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“communication with their membership was effectively denied to
them.” 117 Representative Barber Conable, a member of the Ways and
Means Committee, reacted to the charities’ concern about member
communications by introducing his own bill118 in December of
1973.119 “The Conable bill retained most of the provisions of the
second Ullman-Schneebeli bill, but excluded communications with
members from the definition of influencing legislation, and deleted
the penalty tax provision, the provision relating to section 501(c)(4)
organizations, and the self-terminating provision.”120
The Conable bill, upon its reintroduction in early 1974, was
subject to significant discussion and amendment.121 The Ways and
Means Committee adopted the bill, but changed three key provisions,
including the penalty tax provision and the affiliation rules.122 By the
time the Conable bill was ready to leave the committee, the changes
led the Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz report to describe the final product
as “difficult to compare” with prior versions.123 Notably, however, the
committee’s effort marked the first use of the phrases “qualified
lobbying amounts” and “exempt purpose expenditures,” both
significant terms in the final rules adopted in H.R.
13500.124Congressman Conable was not, however, happy with all of
these changes to his bill, and as the congressional session was
drawing to a close, he asked that it be withdrawn in its entirety.125
Finally, in the second half of 1975 an agreeable solution was
reached. In June, Congressman Conable introduced a second bill,126
cosponsored by twenty-three members of the House Ways and Means
Committee.127 In December, Senator Muskie, with eleven members—
approximately half128 of the Senate Finance Committee—offered an
“identical” bill.129
117 Id.
118 H.R.

12037, 93d Cong. (1973).
on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38.
120 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2927.
121 See id. at 2928 (noting that the bill was a compromise between the different proposals).
122 See id. (noting that “the proposed bill would accomplish a great deal. It would take care
of the major concerns of the charities by allowing three things: 1. Definite provision with
respect to direct lobbying. . . . 2. Freedom to communicate on proper subjects with bona fide
members. . . . 3. Some residual protection for any combination of grass-roots lobbying and
minor expenditures in any other area.”).
123 Id.; see also Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38 (noting that “several changes
of format and substance were made”).
124 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2928 (internal quotation marks omitted).
125 Id.
126 H.R. 8021, 94th Cong. (1975).
127 Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38.
128 Compare Membership of the Committee (By Congress and Session): Select Committee
on Finance and an Uniform National Currency, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FIN.,
http://finance.senate.gov/download/?id=e4b3f33b-d064-4ab0-8959-2d00f518a9f8 (last visited
119 Hearings
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H.R. 13500, therefore, did not simply slip through the halls of
Congress and on to the President’s desk. Describing Barber Conable’s
earlier H.R. 12037, the lawyers at Pepper, Hamilton & Sheetz
characterized the effort as one that “represents a compromise on a
compromise on a compromise on a compromise.”130 Considering,
then, that H.R. 13500 was the product of at least three more proposals
and two more years of compromise and discussion after the
introduction of H.R. 12037, the complexity of the background to H.R.
13500’s passage is hard to overstate.
The detailed legislative history and the path of amendments over a
six-year period and nine separate pieces of legislation sheds light on
Congress’s intentions in providing an alternative for the Substantial
Part Test. This history suggests that congressional action was
significantly motivated by a desire to simplify and clarify the rules
and definitions that restrict legislative activities by charities and to
provide equal access to Congress for charities and business.
Congress’s intent was not to prohibit lobbying by public charities, and
the legislative history to the 1976 Act does not reflect concern that
legislative activities are in some way incompatible with public
purposes. Rather, Congress seemed to value and crave more rather
than less input from the charitable sector on policy reform. Congress
was concerned about the severity of the loss of exemption penalty for
charities that crossed the undefined line of substantial lobbying.
Reflecting this concern, Congress fashioned an intermediate sanction
to make legislative activities less risky.
Although initially concerned about charities lobbying the public
(so called “grassroots” lobbying), Congress ultimately opted not to
prohibit that activity, but rather to limit it out of some unidentified
fear. Finally, although a regressive sliding scale that prefers smaller
organizations over those with large budgets and endowments arose
from the legislative dust, those regressive limits seem to stem more
from compromise than from any overriding intent to generally limit
legislative activity by public charities. Even more perplexing, in light
of the legislative history, is the source and policy behind the
particular limits that appeared in the enacted legislation. Although
reasons for the regressivity of the formula were hinted at, no clues

Apr. 9, 2012) (showing the members of the 94th Senate Finance Committee as having eighteen
members), with Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38 (noting that eleven members of
the Senate Finance Committee joined cosponsored the bill).
129 S. 2832, 94th Cong. (1975); see Hearings on H.R. 13500, supra note 83, at 38 (noting
that the bills were identical).
130 Pepper, Hamilton Report, supra note 87, at 2928.
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reflect a rationale for the limits selected or whether the limits were
negotiated or well-vetted. The absence of any history regarding the
selected limits, combined with clear history that demonstrates
congressional intent to increase, rather than limit, legislative activity
by public charities, suggests that the limits may not serve any
identifiable policy purpose.
B. How it Works
As stated above, section 501(h) is essentially a safe harbor
provision; it permits eligible organizations131 to elect the Expenditure
Test as a substitute for the Substantial Part Test. The objective nature
of the Expenditure Test makes it much more useful than the
subjective Substantial Part Test for public charities wishing to impact
public policy in a meaningful way.
Two distinct issues arise in connection with section 501(h). First is
the issue of excise tax liability for excessive lobbying activities in any
given year. This does not necessarily lead to loss of exemption. The
second issue is loss of exemption that may result from excessive
lobbying activities that continue over a period of time. Specifically,
unlike a finding that a “substantial part” of an organization’s activities
consist of lobbying, breaching the concrete ceilings provided by the
Expenditure Test in one year will not result in a revocation of
501(c)(3) status. Rather, exceeding the limitations provided by
section 4911 in any year will result in a 25 percent excise or penalty
tax on excess expenditures, and only after an organization has been
found to “normally” exceed the limits—that is, after it has exceeded
the stated ceilings132 over a “four-year period”—will the organization
risk loss of its exempt status.133
The precise mechanics of sections 501(h) and 4911 are complex,134
and this Article does not intend to summarize the law, but a few
points should be mentioned. A charity with a section 501(h) election
in effect is permitted to spend a fixed amount on overall lobbying and
a smaller fixed amount on grassroots lobbying.135 The amount that a
131 See I.R.C § 501(h)(5) (2006) (providing that eligible organizations are electing public
charities other than churches and certain affiliated entities and organizations of churches and
private foundations, which are not eligible to make the § 501(h) election).
132 These ceilings are referred to as the “Lobbying Ceiling Amount” and the “Grass Roots
Ceiling Amount.”
133 See Measuring Lobbying: Substantial Part Test, supra note 53.
134 I.R.C. §§ 501(h), 4911; Treas. Reg. §§ 1.501(h), 56.4911 (1990). For further
information on the mechanics of the code, see generally JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN
SCHWARZ, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 5 (3d ed. 2006), Mayer,
supra note 26, at 494–501, and Chisolm, supra note 17, at 11–40.
135 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(h)–3.
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charity may spend without penalty (i.e., the “Lobbying Nontaxable
Amount” and the “Grassroots Nontaxable Amount”) is defined as a
percentage of the charity’s exempt purpose expenditures.136 Exempt
purpose expenditures, as the words suggest, are the amounts treated
under the Code and regulations as being spent by an organization to
further its exempt purpose.137 In effect, the exempt purpose
expenditure of an organization is the “overall measuring rod against
which an organization’s lobbying expenses are tested.”138 Lobbying
expenditures are expenditures made in connection with influencing
legislation, as that term is defined in section 4911(d), and are
classified as either direct lobbying expenditures or grassroots
expenditures.139 Grassroots expenditures, used to produce
communications intended to influence the public, are subject to a
stricter cap140 and therefore more limited than direct lobbying
expenditures, for purposes of imposing both the intermediate sanction
and the ultimate sanction of loss of exemption.
The Lobbying Nontaxable Amount and the Grassroots Nontaxable
Amount, and, therefore, the Lobbying Ceiling Amount and the
Grassroots Ceiling Amount, are determined based on regressive
sliding scales. The maximum nontaxable and ceiling amounts kick in
when an organization’s exempt purpose expenditures reach $17
million for a given year.141 As a result, organizations with large
budgets and endowments are more restricted than their smaller
counterparts, and larger organizations may be permitted to engage in

136 Id.;

I.R.C. § 4911(c).
§ 4911(e)(1); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–4.
138 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 134, at 524.
139 “Influencing legislation” means any attempt to influence any legislation (A) “through
an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof” (i.e., grassroots
lobbying), or (B) “through communication with any member or employee of a legislative body,
or with any government official or employee who may participate in the formulation of the
legislation” (i.e., direct lobbying). I.R.C. § 4911(d)(1). There are some important exceptions to
this definition, including (1) “making available the results to nonpartisan analysis, study, or
research,” (2) “providing technical advice or assistance . . . to a governmental body . . . [at the
request of] such body,” and (3) certain communications with members. I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2); see
also Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–2(c) (providing a detailed explanation of the exceptions).
140 The grassroots nontaxable amount for any year is limited to 25 percent of the lobbying
nontaxable amount for that year. I.R.C. § 4911(c)(4). See also Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–3
(providing further detail as to the definition of direct lobbying and grassroots communications).
141 I.R.C. § 4911(c)(2) (providing that the maximum lobbying nontaxable amount is the
lesser of $1,000,000 or, where exempt purpose expenditures exceed $1,500,000, $225,000 plus
5 percent of the excess of exempt purpose expenditures over $1,500,000, which equates to a
$17,000,000 cap for exempt purpose expenditures that can be used to increase an organization’s
nontaxable amount ($15,500,000 multiplied by 5 percent equals $775,000, which added to the
$225,000 from the initial $1,500,000 totals $1,000,000, i.e., the maximum lobbying nontaxable
amount)); Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–1(c)(1)(ii).
137 I.R.C.

5/16/2012 12:43:26 PM

780

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:3

more legislative activity under the Substantial Part Test than under
the Expenditure Test.
C. Benefits of the Expenditure Test
The primary benefit of the Expenditure Test is clarity—both
clarity as to what an organization can spend and as to what it can
spend on. A safe harbor with bright line limitations should appeal to
charities. It is therefore curious that less than 2 percent of eligible
charities have actually made the election, and that the percentage of
eligible organizations making the election has barely increased over
the past two decades. As of 1989, only an estimated 1 percent of
eligible organizations had taken advantage of the 501(h) election.142
In 1993, Miriam Galston intuitively argued that this minimal appeal
could be attributed to the fact that final Treasury regulations were not
codified until 1990 and that the certainty of the finalized regulations
would lead to a greater proportion of eligible organizations making
the election in the future.143 Similarly, Professor Laura Chisolm
predicted in 1994, that:
it seems almost inevitable that the carefully crafted and
highly workable standards of the 1990 regulations will, over
time, become the measuring rod against which the activities
of public charities that engage in issue advocacy will be
evaluated. With detailed standards in place for electing
organizations, it becomes harder to imagine Service or court
decisions resting on an unmodified, know-it when-we-see-it
approach, even if the organization at issue has not elected to
come under section 501(h). Furthermore, it is likely that
organizations with policy advocacy as a primary or
secondary, as opposed to incidental, focus will choose to
place themselves under the more predictable 501(h)
framework.144
Commentators have overwhelmingly favored section 501(h)
elections for public charities wishing to influence policy through
legislative activity.145 The then-Assistant IRS Commissioner for
142 Michael S. Moriarty, Revised ‘Grass Roots Lobbying’ Regulations, TAX NOTES, Jan.–
Mar. 1989, at 149, 150 (1989).
143 Galston, supra note 62, at 1280 n.26.
144 Chisolm, supra note 17, at 26 (citations omitted).
145 For
examples of commentators favoring section 501(h), see Thomas R.
Asher, Lobbying by Public Charities: The 1990 IRS Regulations, 20 NYU TAX PLAN. 501(C)(3)
ORG. 3–1, § 3.06[2] (1992), Chisolm, supra note 17, at 26, Thomas A. Troyer & Amy R.
Segal, Lobbying and Political Activities of Charities, 21 NYU TAX PLAN. 501(C)(3) ORG. 11–1,
§ 11.02[5] (1993), and Thomas A. Troyer et al., Final Lobbying Regulations Provide Workable
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Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations predicted as much, but
one commentator opined that there would be “no rush” to take up the
new election in part because of the hassle of “additional
paperwork.”146 Based on statistics from 2009, both Professor Galston
and Professor Chisolm appear to have been surprisingly less than
prophetic: according to the National Center for Charitable Statistics,
12,795 active 501(c)(3) organizations had made the election as of the
fall of 2009.147 This number represents less than 1.3 percent of listed
eligible charities at the time.148 The strange disinterest in this helpful
safe harbor is hard to explain, except in light of the daunting
complexity of the rules.
For an eligible charity wishing to participate in the legislative
process, the Expenditure Test provides significant benefits. The
objective nature of the test permits charity managers to know exactly
how much of their funds can be spent on lobbying and legislative
activity without jeopardizing the organization’s exempt status.
Furthermore, the clearly defined relevant terms let charity managers
know precisely what they can spend those dollars on. Since the
spending limitations are based solely on dollars spent, an election is
quite favorable to any charity that can engage in “cheap” lobbying,
for example on the Web or using volunteers. In fact, organizations
that can lobby effectively using their Web sites and emails can engage
in virtually unlimited lobbying under the Expenditure Test. The
ability to use the Internet to influence the public (and perhaps
Congress as well) on legislative matters renders the dollar limitations
imposed by the Expenditure Test useless in many cases. Furthermore,
the liberal member communication rules provide a benefit to member
organizations by permitting them to lobby without burning up any

Guidance, 74 J. TAX’N 124, 130 (1991).
146 Moriarty, supra note 142, at 150.
147 501(h)
Electors,
NAT’L
CENTER
FOR
CHARITABLE
STAT.,
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/knowledgebase/detail.php?linkID=454&category=13&xrefID=42
19&close=1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
148 See Number of Public Charities in the United States, 2010, NAT’L CENTER FOR
CHARITABLE
STAT.,
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/PubApps/profileDrillDown.php?state=US&rpt=PC (last visited
Apr. 9, 2012) (displaying the number of public charities as of April 2010). Even assuming that
the number of churches and related ineligible organizations falls halfway between the 222,145
501(c)(3) public charity organizations classified as “Religion Related, Spiritual Development”
in IRS filings, id., and the 91,000 congregations (of any religion) that filed with the IRS as of
2007, only approximately 1.5% of eligible organizations elected would have elected as of 2009.
Identifying Faith-based Organizations in NCCS Databases (Method Note), NAT’L CENTER FOR
CHARITABLE
STAT.,
http://nccsdataweb.urban.org/knowledgebase/detail.php?linkID=85&category=118&xrefID=35
26&close=1 (last visited Apr. 9, 2012).
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Lobbying Nontaxable Amount or Lobbying Ceiling Amount, or by
treating grassroots lobbying expenditures as direct lobbying
expenditures, subject to a higher monetary cap.149 Finally, the many
exceptions to the definition of lobbying contained in section
4911(d)(2) permit “free” lobbying for charities engaging in lobbying
that is not treated as lobbying for purposes of the Expenditure Test.150
A well-counseled organization can use many of these excepted
communications to impact policy without expending Lobbying and
Grassroots Nontaxable Amounts.

149 See I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)(D), 4911(d)(3); see also Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–3 (1990)
(providing liberal allocation rules regarding what portion of a lobbying costs are direct lobbying
expenditures and grassroots expenditures).
150 I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2) states:

For purposes of this section, the term “influencing legislation”, with respect to an
organization, does not include—
(A) making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or
research;
(B) providing of technical advice or assistance (where such advice would
otherwise constitute the influencing of legislation) to a governmental
body or to a committee or other subdivision thereof in response to a
written request by such body or subdivision, as the case may be;
(C) appearances before, or communications to, any legislative body with
respect to a possible decision of such body which might affect the
existence of the organization, its powers and duties, tax-exempt status, or
the deduction of contributions to the organization;
(D) communications between the organization and its bona fide members
with respect to legislation or proposed legislation of direct interest to the
organization and such members, other than communications described in
paragraph (3); and
(E) any communication with a governmental official or employee, other
than—
(i) a communication with a member or employee of a
legislative body (where such communication would otherwise
constitute the influencing of legislation), or
(ii) a communication the principal purpose of which is to
influence legislation.
Furthermore, in another example of generosity and leniency in the Expenditure Test
definitions, “grass roots lobbying,” requires a reference to specific legislation, reflection of a
view on that legislation, and encouragement of the recipient of the communication to take action
with respect to the legislation, is easy to structure around by omitting any one of those factors.
Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–2(b)(2).
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III. PROPOSAL I: ABANDON RESTRICTIONS ON LEGISLATIVE
ACTIVITY BY PUBLIC CHARITIES
A. Policy Reasons For and Against Permitting Unlimited
Charitable Legislative Speech
1. Policy Arguments For Unlimited Lobbying
A plethora of sound policy reasons may be conjured to permit
public charities to lobby. First, debate is good for society regardless
of what is being debated and who is doing the debating, and lobbying
by public charities increases the number of voices in the discourse.
Moreover, public charities permit voices less often heard in the
discourse to participate. Second, charities can be effective and
efficient vehicles for the public’s participation in formulating public
policy and the laws embodying that policy. As the late Professor
Laura Brown Chisolm stated in her seminal article, Exempt
Organization Advocacy: Matching the Rules to the Rationales,
“[M]any believe that the roles of advocate and improver of social
systems, empowerer of citizens, and critic and monitor of government
policies and programs are among the most crucial functions of the
nonprofit sector.”151 Third, the rights of citizens to petition the
government is fundamental to our notion of democracy.152 Fourth,
organizations described in section 501(c)(4)153 that “promote social
welfare” can lobby without limitation, presumably because lobbying
is an activity that promotes social welfare.154 In fact, included in the
definition of “charitable” in the Treasury regulations defining that
term is the “promotion of social welfare.”155 If legislative activity
promotes social welfare, it is therefore charitable and charities are not
and should not be limited in the amount of charitable activity in
which they can engage. And finally, a public charity lobbying to
further the interests of its constituents just seems charitable,

151 Chisolm,

supra note 21, at 205 (footnotes omitted).
CONST. amend. I; see generally Mayer, supra note 26, at 486 (“It is protected by
the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress and by similar provisions in
numerous state constitutions.”).
153 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).
154 See Mayer, supra note 26, at 539 (observing the benefits of legislative activity,
including “supplying valuable information and advice for government decision makers,
informing citizens of proposed and current government actions and thus increasing the
transparency of government, and creating a mechanism through which citizens can both
participate in politics generally and influence specific government actions”).
155 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(d)(2) (as amended in 2008).
152 U.S.
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particularly if the legislative activity furthers the charitable mission of
the organization.156
In sum, the charitable sector brings new perspectives to legislative
discourse, and those perspectives serve to enlighten legislative
discussion. In other words, “the voluntary sector [provides]
‘countervailing definitions of reality and morality—ideologies,
perspectives and world views that frequently challenge the prevailing
assumptions about what exists and what is good and what should be
done in society; [and] is most likely to say that the emperor has no
clothes.’”157 For these reasons, Congress should eliminate the
restrictions on lobbying by public charities to encourage legislative
activity by these organizations.
2. Policy Arguments Against Lobbying
Policy reasons are occasionally cited for limiting charitable
legislative activity. These include (1) the negative perception that
Americans have of lobbying and lobbyists,158 (2) the argument that
government should remain neutral with regard to lobbying by its
citizens,159 (3) the notion that unrestricted lobbying is antithetical to a
majoritarian system of government, (4) the comparison with
businesses, individuals, and other entities as opposed to veteran’s
organizations,160 and (5) the availability of the 501(c)(4)161
alternative.
Given Americans’ negative perception of lobbying and lobbyists
in general, unlimited lobbying by charities might precipitate suspicion
and negativity from the public. As Miriam Galston reflects:
“‘Lobbying’ is a dirty word. . . . [And] most people associate
156 For example, an organization formed to feed the hungry should be entitled to weigh in
on food policy in furtherance of its mission, and an environmental group should join the
discourse on environmental policy to further its mission. Even the IRS would agree with this
conclusion. See Rev. Rul. 80–279, 1980–2 C.B. 176 (holding that an organization engaged in
legal research for and mediation of international environmental disputes, which included
making its results known to the public by means of lectures, published articles, and interviews,
qualified for 501(c)(3) exemption, because its activities constituted a long-recognized charitable
purpose).
157 Wilbur J. Cohen, Some Aspects of Evolving Social Policy in Relation to Private
Philanthropy, in 2 COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS, RESEARCH
PAPERS 657, 667 (1977) (citation omitted).
158 See infra notes 162–63 and accompanying text (discussing this perception).
159 See infra notes 164–67 and accompanying text (discussing the neutrality argument).
160 See infra notes 168–73 and accompanying text (making these comparisons).
161 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006). Organizations described in section 501(c)(4) are exempt from
federal income tax under section 501(a) and are operated for the promotion of social welfare. A
501(c)(4) organization may further its purposes through lobbying as its primary or only activity
without jeopardizing its exempt status but is not eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions
under I.R.C. § 170(c). Id; I.R.C. § 170(c).
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lobbying with pressure tactics at best, and with bribery or blackmail
at worst.”162 Similarly, another commentator suggests that “[i]f one
were to ask a friend, any friend, whether lobbying the legislature and
campaigning for candidate X were charitable activities, four out of
five answers would likely be quick, and negative.”163 While these
statements ring true and may provide a convincing argument against
requiring charities to lobby, they do not provide a similarly
compelling case against permitting legislative activity by charities.
First, charities will never be required to engage in legislative activity.
The risk that lobbying will engender a negative public reaction is a
risk that charities can choose to take or avoid. Presumably, a
thoughtful board would weigh the potential damage of public
suspicion against the benefit to be achieved by the legislative
engagement and make an informed and rigorous decision.
Furthermore, as long as charities lobby responsibly and in furtherance
of mission, there is no reason to believe that negative reaction among
those who support that mission would ensue.
A second contention against permitting charities to lobby is the
notion that governments should remain neutral with regard to
lobbying by their citizens, refusing to take sides by “subsidizing” any
particular lobbying effort. As Judge Learned Hand concluded in Slee
v. Commissioner,164 “the Treasury stands aside” from political
controversies (in that case, the provision of birth control).165 Learned
Hand concluded that “[p]olitical agitation as such is outside the
statute, however innocent the aim . . . .”166 Professor Chisolm perhaps
said it best when she debunked the neutrality argument, concluding:
Even if the present system could be accurately characterized
as neutral, maintaining that neutrality would be misguided.
Neutrality is neither constitutionally required, nor necessarily
supportable as a matter of good policy. Rules which have the
effect of either limiting or encouraging advocacy activity
should aim to protect the integrity of the processes to which
the advocacy is directed. Where technical neutrality
contributes to unequal access to governmental institutions and
processes, reinforces rather than relieves the chronic
voicelessness of some segments of society, and leads to social
policy built on incomplete information, it no longer provides
162 Galston,

supra note 62, at 1270.
supra note 34, at 85.
164 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930).
165 Id. at 185.
166 Id.; see also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512 (1959) (agreeing with
Hand).
163 Houck,
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an acceptable foundation upon which to rest a system of
controls and incentives.167
Restrictions on legislative speech of charities skew, rather than
augment, the legislative process. That price for alleged (or even
actual) neutrality is too costly for society to bear.
Some critics of lobbying by charities have asked, perhaps as an
extension to the neutrality argument, Why permit charities to lobby
with deductible contributions when businesses,168 individuals,169 and
other entities170 cannot do so? In other words, Why should the
government subsidize legislative activities of charities if legislative
activities of other constituents are not similarly subsidized? First, this
argument has several technical flaws, as businesses can deduct
lobbying expenditures in many instances.171 Second, some
organizations exempt under 501(a), specifically veterans’
organizations,172 can lobby without limitation with tax deductible,
non-taxed dollars.173 This further erodes the “neutrality” argument, as
well. Finally, as a policy matter comparing charities to businesses,
individuals, and other noncharitable entities as an excuse for
subjecting charities to the limits imposed elsewhere is unwise. Public
charities likely to lobby generally represent a group of constituents
traditionally less engaged in the legislative process.
Finally, because charities can, under current law, set up a 501(c)(4)
organization and engage in unlimited legislative activity, albeit not
with tax deductible contributions, many argue that release of the
limits within the 501(c)(3) are unnecessary.174 Although charities can
167 Chisolm,

supra note 21, at 252 (footnotes omitted).
§ 162(e)(1) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.162–20(c)(3) (as amended in 1995).
169 See I.R.C. § 170(c) (disallowing a charitable deduction for individuals who give to
organizations that are disqualified for lobbying).
170 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 162(e)(3) (business leagues).
171 I.R.C. § 162(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.162–20(c)(3); see also Ronald S. Borod, Lobbying for
the Public Interest—Federal Tax Policy and Administration, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1087, 1112
(1967) (noting that “the business community can deduct their lobbying expenses, while all
others cannot”).
172 I.R.C. § 501(c)(19); see Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540,
548–551 (1983) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the preferential treatment afforded to
veterans associations).
173 The dollars are often deductible under section 170(a) (assuming an itemizing donor)
and generally are not taxed to the organization (assuming the funds are not subject to the
unrelated business income tax). I.R.C. §§ 170(a); 501(c)(3); 511–514.
174 See Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous
for 501(c)(3)s, Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1325 (2007) (arguing that
charities receive “subsidies” for the nature of their work and the nature of their work does not
include legislative activity, that if the charity engages in such activity, it should no longer
receive their subsidy, and therefore, the organization should create a section 501(c)(4) affiliate if
it wishes to engage in unlimited legislative activity); see also Chisolm, supra note 21, at 236
(explaining the 501(c)(4) organization option).
168 I.R.C.
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set up 501(c)(4) organizations to carry on unlimited legislative
activity, setting up and operating one is a significant burden both
administratively and as a matter of fundraising.175 Furthermore,
501(c)(4) organizations may represent different voices from affiliated
501(c)(3)s because their funders may be unique and have diverse
interests. Additionally, as noted above, the comparison with social
welfare organizations suggests that limitations on legislative activities
by public charities should be released.176 If lobbying is a social
welfare activity and charities may be formed to “promote social
welfare,” no logical conclusion for restricting lobbying by charities
can follow.
The policy arguments against charitable legislative speech are less
compelling than the arguments for permitting the activity without
limit. Unlimited legislative activity by charities should be encouraged
in order to increase debate and the number of voices in the discourse.
Both Congress and the public benefit from the increased and more
diverse discourse. The benefits that would accrue to society from the
additional debate would overwhelm any negative impact that may be
feared.
B. Technical Reasons For and Against Permitting Unlimited
Charitable Legislative Speech
1. Technical Reasons For Permitting Unlimited Charitable
Legislative Speech
A second, more technical, set of rationales for permitting unlimited
lobbying by public charities is that current restrictions are ambiguous,
confusing, ineffective, and outdated. The boundaries drawn under
current law are unworkable and far too easily avoidable by a welllawyered organization. Moreover, both compliance with and
enforcement of these rules is unnecessarily expensive.
As mentioned above, the Substantial Part Test is far too vague and
subjective to provide proper guidance to organizations wanting to
influence legislation to further exempt purposes. While the
Expenditure Test contains bright lines and helpful definitions, none of
these lines or definitions is available to non-electors.177 And even the
175 See Chisolm, supra note 21, at 239–240 (explaining the difficulties implicit in the
section 501(c)(4) option).
176 See discussion supra Part III.A.I.
177 If, ultimately, the law does not change and the Substantial Part Test remains the default
measurement for lobbying, at the very least, the section 501(h) and section 4911 definitions
should apply for purposes of that test. These definitions do apply to determine whether private
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measuring rods for substantiality used in the Substantial Part Test are
fuzzy. Various elements may be taken into account to determine how
much lobbying is too much under the Substantial Part Test, including
money spent, volunteer time employed, and the continuity and
visibility (and perhaps the controversial nature) of the legislative
activities, but no clear guidelines exist for identifying, much less
weighing, these factors.178 Effectively, these nebulous boundaries
restrict charities’ ability to lobby by failing to enlighten them as to
how much legislative activity will jeopardize their exemption. In
other words, charities tend to be so frightened of transversing this
invisible line that they forego even “insubstantial” lobbying. In effect,
ignorance paralyzes eligible charities and prohibits them from
fulfilling their potential in impacting law and public policy.179
While the Expenditure Test electable under 501(h) does not suffer
from the same lack of clarity, it is ineffective, hypertechnical, and
outdated in the twenty-first century. Unlike the subjective Substantial
Part Test, the Expenditure Test is full of bright lines and crystal-clear
definitions. As a legislative fix to the woes of the Substantial Part
Test, it probably made terrific sense in 1976 when it was enacted.
As mentioned above, the primary benefit of the Expenditure Test
is clarity—both clarity as to how much an organization can spend and
as to what it can spend on. A safe harbor with bright-line limitations
should appeal to charities. It is therefore curious that less than 2
percent of eligible charities have actually made the election.180
The Expenditure Test’s primary difficulties are its over-complexity
and that most of its restrictions are too easily avoided with the help of
a knowledgeable lawyer. The test was enacted in 1976 and the world
has changed quite a bit in the ensuing thirty-six years in many ways
that impact the efficacy of the restrictions imposed under the 501(h)
election. First, the World Wide Web was not around in 1976.
Lobbying required drafting, printing, posting, stamping, and mailing
letters, brochures, flyers, and pamphlets, and significant travel. In

foundations have lobbied. Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2 (as amended in 1990).
178 See Galston, supra note 62, at 1279–1280 (discussing the Substantial Part Test’s
vagueness).
179 See LESTER M. SALAMON & STEPHANIE LESSENS GELLER, JOHNS HOPKINS LISTENING
POST PROJECT, COMMUNIQUÉ NO. 9, NONPROFIT AMERICA: A FORCE FOR DEMOCRACY (2008),
available
at
http://ccss.jhu.edu/wpcontent/uploads/downloads/2011/09/LP_Communique9_2008.pdf. This project surveyed a
sample of 872 nonprofit organizations nationwide, 48 percent of which responded that they did
not engage in lobbying because they were “[w]orried about violating laws.” Id. at 9.
180 See CENTER FOR LOBBYING IN THE PUB. INT., supra note 8 (explaining that more than
90 percent of charities have continued to use the Substantial Part Test).
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other words, lobbying required lots of money. Today, organizations
can and do lobby virtually for free on the Internet and use email to
correspond with legislators and constituents. New technology makes
it possible to schedule “virtual meetings” with legislators at virtually
no cost.181 Organizations that lobby through the Internet and other
modes of digital communication can reach millions, maybe billions,
of people without spending much of their section 501(h) permissible
lobbying amounts other than costs of employee time (where
volunteers are unavailable) and connectivity (a trivial number by most
accounts). Future technological advances inevitably will continue the
march toward free (or inexpensive) lobbying not contemplated in
1976. This makes and will continue to make the sections 501(h) and
4911 limitations useless for wisely crafted lobbying. Useless
restrictions should be repealed because they confuse but do not
restrict.
Second, the very liberal rules under section 4911 make it possible
for many charities (particularly those with members) to engage in
significant legislative activity that does not count as lobbying.182 The
Internet multiplies the amount of “non-lobbying” lobbying a
membership organization can accomplish. Again, properly structured
lobbying can be practically limitless, so why impose limits?
Effectively, most charities electing the Expenditure Test can lobby
almost without effective limit if they employ a crafty and
knowledgeable lawyer. The benefits of increased discourse and the
inefficacy of the restrictions on lobbying mandate unrestricted
lobbying for public charities.
2. Technical Reasons Against Permitting Unlimited Charitable
Legislative Speech
The most significant technical argument against permitting
unlimited legislative activity by charities centers on the possibility
that the elimination of the current restrictions might result in abuse.
For example, twenty-seven donors could unite to form a charity, pass

181 Participants in this kind of lobbying use e-mails, phone calls, Skype, and social
networking tools like Facebook and Twitter to “meet” with legislators. Some organizations have
organized a “Virtual Lobbying Day” during which they encourage members themselves to
engage in a communication blitz upon legislators. See, e.g., Be a Part of the Innovation
Movement’s
Virtual
Lobby
Day,
THE
INNOVATION
MOVEMENT,
http://www.declareinnovation.com/?/issues/be-a-part-of-the-innovation-movments-first-evervirtual-lobby-day (last visited Apr. 9, 2012) (inviting people to participate in a “Virtual Lobby
Day”).
182 See Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–5 (1990) (allowing for “more lenient[]” treatment of certain
lobbying expenditures involving communications to a charity’s members).
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the public support test,183 and engage in selfish lobbying in public
charity form.184 Alternatively, the selfish donors might achieve the
same goal by setting up a supporting organization as defined in
section 509(a)(3), assuming that they could identify (or perhaps
create) a cooperative public charity to support.185 But selfish lobbying
was precisely what Congress intended to avoid when it added the “no
substantial part” language to the Code in 1934.186 Therefore, this
possibility presents a genuine threat to the integrity of the operational
test for charities.187
Most would agree that an organization that engages in selfish
lobbying (i.e., lobbying that promotes the individual interests of its
leaders rather than the interests of the public it serves) should not pass
the operational test for classification as a charity. On the other hand,
as argued earlier, lobbying that furthers a true charitable purpose188
should pass muster and should be encouraged by the law. The
questions raised by this potential for technical abuse are: (a) how
likely is this abuse to occur, and (b) how can the potential for abuse
be mitigated?
As to the first question, Congress disposed of much of the
potential for selfish lobbying in 1969 when it defined legislative
activity by private foundations as a taxable expenditure,189 effectively
prohibiting any direct lobbying by private foundations.190 The
possibility of creative structuring remains, which would enable
entities that are functionally private foundations to qualify as public
charities either under the public support test of section 509(a)(1) or as
supporting organizations under section 509(a)(3), as mentioned
above.191 With respect to supporting organizations, the risk is minimal
(although not nonexistent) because of the requisite control that must
be exercised by the supported organization for it to maintain its
exempt status. Moreover, as the eminent scholar Marion R. FremontSmith has convincingly argued, most charities operate for the public
183 See

I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) (2006) (outlining the public support test).
group thus formed could avoid private foundation status under Code section
509(a)(1) and the restrictions on legislative activity by private foundations. I.R.C. § 509(a)(1).
185 See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3) (exempting organizations that are operated to support charities).
186 For a discussion of legislative history of Revenue Act of 1934, see supra notes 44–48
and accompanying text.
187 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(c) (as amended in 2008) (stating the operational test for
determining whether a substantial part of a charity’s activities are lobbying).
188 See supra note 156 for examples.
189 I.R.C. § 4945; see also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION,
91ST CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1969, at 47 (1970)
(discussing the tax imposed on private foundations by the Tax Reform Act of 1969).
190 See discussion of private foundations infra Part IV.A.1.
191 See supra notes 181–85 and accompanying text (discussing ways to circumvent the
taxes imposed on private foundations).
184 The
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good and intentional malfeasance is rare.192 But some creative
structuring for selfish lobbying purposes inevitably occurs under
current law and arguably would increase if restrictions on legislative
activities of public charities vanished, which would increase the value
of public charity status to selfish donors.
This conclusion leads us to the second question, what to do about
the abuse? Congressional and Treasury effort here should aim to
reduce potential for abuse rather than to restrict legislative activity by
well-intended charities. Abuse reduction might require heavy-handed
anti-abuse laws that penalize only true culprits and deter only
culpable charities and their managers but do not impact the innocent.
Excise taxes and loss of exemption could be used to deter and
penalize without quelling sincere legislative activity by charities.
Arguably, these penalties are already in place for charities that serve
selfish interests rather than public interests.193 Additional disclosure
requirements might necessarily be implemented to help the IRS
identify bad actors. Given the probability that the feared abuse will be
minimal and the possibility of implementing additional disclosure and
penalty provisions to identify and punish that abuse, the technical
arguments raised against unlimited legislative activity by public
charities do not outweigh the public good that charities can
accomplish with unlimited lobbying.
IV. PROPOSAL II: FIX THE EXPENDITURE TEST
Although the elimination of restrictions on nonprofit legislative
speech is the preferable outcome for the reasons discussed above, a
distant second choice is to continue to impose lobbying restrictions
through the Expenditure Test but to fix it, simplify it, and make it the
default test for measuring permissible legislative activity by public
charities. Specifically, this suggestion would require amending and
expanding the Expenditure Test to make it more palatable for and
accessible to a broader range of organizations by removing
192 See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Pillaging of Charitable Assets: Embezzlement and
Fraud, 46 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 333, 334 (2004) (finding only thirty-two reports of criminal
wrongdoing by lower-level employees targeting their own charities in 2003); Marion R.
Fremont-Smith & Andras Kosaras, Wrongdoing by Officers and Directors of Charities: A
Survey of Press Reports 1995–2002, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 25, 33–34 (2003) (finding 104
reports of criminal wrongdoing and fifty-four reports of a breach of fiduciary duty by officers
and directors of charities over a seven-year period, and arguing that this small number relative
to 1.4 million charitable organizations “does not on its face support congressional charges made
during 2002 and 2003 of widespread abuses on the part of these organizations”).
193 See I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3), 4958 (excluding from the exemption organizations that
participate or intervene in political campaigns and imposing excise tax sanctions on excess
benefit transactions).
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regressivity, increasing caps at least to keep pace with inflation,
educating charities who fear it because they do not understand it, and
making it the default test for all public charities.
A. Expand the List of Eligible Organizations
Not all organizations described in section 501(c)(3) are eligible to
elect the Expenditure Test. Excluded organizations include private
foundations and churches.194 As a first step, the law should be
amended to permit churches and their affiliates to use the Expenditure
Test.
1. Private Foundations
The rationale for disqualifying private foundations195 is fairly
obvious, although not necessarily justifiable. Congress was
concerned, and perhaps rightly so, about selfish lobbying by private
charities, since they are not subject to the restraints imposed by public
accountability discussed above.196 There is simply too much private,
rather than public, control and too much risk that deductible
contributions and exempt funds will be used to further the personal
interests of those in control of the foundation.197 Accordingly, in
1969, Congress opted to significantly curtail legislative activity by
private foundations by including amounts expended to influence
legislation in the definition of “taxable expenditure,” subject to
penalties under section 4945.198
The restrictions on lobbying by private foundations have
engendered much discussion. Foundations themselves have argued
that the restrictions tie their hands and make them less effective. 199
194 I.R.C. § 501(h)(3), (4), (5); Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2 (as amended in 1990) (rules for
private foundations).
195 Private foundations are defined in I.R.C. § 509(a).
196 See discussion of public accountability supra note 51 and accompanying text.
197 Most private foundations mean well. Very few people would be concerned about selfish
advocacy by some of the larger and most well governed foundations. But the risk still exists.
Congressional hearings on the abuses of private foundations influenced future legislation. Such
abuses included “competitive advantage, self-dealing, delay in benefit to charity, distraction of
management, maintenance of control, and imprudent investment.” Richard Schmalbeck,
Reconsidering Private Foundation Investment Limitations, 58 TAX L. REV. 59, 73 (2004).
198 I.R.C. § 4945(d)(1); see generally Note, Regulating the Political Activity of
Foundations, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1970) (detailing the restrictions and sanctions to be
applied to private foundations under the Tax Reform Act of 1969).
199 Largely motivated by a desire to remove lobbying restrictions and to have a voice in
national debate, Pew Charitable Trusts chose to become a public charity in 2004. See Stephanie
Strom, Pew Charitable Trusts Will Become Public Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2003, at A20
(noting a statement by Rebecca W. Rimel, then president and chief executive of Pew, “‘It will
give us greater flexibility in our operations, as well as economies of scale that we could not
achieve as a private foundation,’” and identifying one advantages as the ability “to lobby on
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The American Bar Association Tax Section Exempt Organizations
Committee has suggested that “[t]he absolute prohibition against
lobbying activity in section 4945(d)(1) does not serve an articulated
policy goal and adds burdensome complexity to grantmaking
compliance.”200 This position may overstate the problem and
understate the ability of a well-advised foundation to advocate. The
ABA’s statement also overlooks Congress’s fairly well articulated
policy goal of avoiding selfish lobbying.201
The strict constraints on private foundation lobbying and the
concomitant exclusion of private foundations from the Expenditure
Test naturally impose a burden on a private foundation wishing to
influence legislation in furtherance of its charitable purpose. But not
all of the news for private foundations is bad. First, private
foundations can engage in activities that influence legislation that are
not defined as “lobbying” for purposes of the Expenditure Test.202
The liberal definitions found in section 4911 give private foundations
some wiggle room to influence legislation with rigorously structured
“non-lobbying” lobbying.203
Second, one could argue that private foundations are not subject to
an “absolute prohibition on lobbying activity in section 4945(d)(1)”204
because of the lenient rules permitting grants to public charities that
do lobby. Although private foundations cannot directly engage in
lobbying activities, private foundations are not prohibited from
making general support grants to charities that engage in lobbying
provided that the grant is not earmarked for lobbying.205 Furthermore,

issues”).
200 Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, List of Code Provisions for Tax
Simplification and Reform Project (unpublished work) (on file with New York University
National Center on Philanthropy and the Law). See also Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Is It Time to
Treat Private Foundations and Public Charities Alike?, 52 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 257, 257
(2006) (suggesting “that in most respects the rationale for the disparity” between private
foundations and public charities “is unfounded”).
201 For a discussion of legislative history of Revenue Act of 1934, see supra notes 44–48
and accompanying text.
202 For example, a private foundation can engage in nonpartisan analysis, study, or
research, or in self-defense lobbying, can provide technical advice to legislators, and can
communicate with the public regarding pending legislation as long as no call to action is
included in the communication. See Treas. Reg. § 54.4945–2(d), which significantly parallels
Treas. Reg. § 56.4911–2(b)(2) (1990).
203 See id. (providing numerous examples of non-lobbying communications).
204 Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, supra note 200.
205 Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(5)(i) (as amended in1990); see also Foundations, CENTER
FOR LOBBYING IN THE PUB. INT., www.clpi.org/the-law/foundations (last visited Apr. 9, 2012)
(“[F]oundations can provide project-related grants to charities that include lobbying so long as
the grant is not “earmarked” for lobbying and does not exceed the non-lobbying portion of the
project budget.”).
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a private foundation special project grant to a public charity is not a
taxable expenditure if none of the grant is earmarked206 for lobbying
and provided that the total amount of the foundation’s special project
grant does not exceed the amount budgeted by the charity for the nonlobbying aspects of the special project.207 These permissive rules
apply even if the public charity ultimately uses some of the grant for
legislative activity.208
Third, private foundation creators, like all other humans, can use
their wealth to create an organization described in section 501(c)(4)
and use the organization exclusively for legislative purposes.209 It
may feel politically awkward, and contributions to the 501(c)(4)
entity would not be deductible,210 but many of the biggest donors get
minimal tax benefits from charitable contributions, in any event.211
Finally, if all else fails, private foundations can use the “Pew
method” to erase most effective lobbying restrictions.212 By forming a
public charity and converting a private foundation into a supporting
organization,213for that newly created public charity the former
private foundation can effect an end run around the private foundation
rules to advocate under the more lenient rules applicable to public
charities.
The issue of lobbying by private foundations is difficult to resolve,
with convincing arguments on both sides of the debate. The
limitations on legislative activities by private foundations do place a
burden on private foundations wishing to engage in lobbying to
further their charitable purposes. But the limits do not completely
prohibit private foundations from influencing the formation of public
policy. The hoops through which private foundations must jump
206 “Earmarked”

is defined in Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(5)(i).
Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(6)(ii).
208 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 53.4945–2(a)(7) Ex. (8), (9) (providing examples of
circumstances where grants to a public charity not earmarked for attempts to influence
legislation do not constitute taxable expenditures). See also, FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note
134.
209 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).
210 I.R.C. § 170(c).
211 Warren Buffett, for example, donated stock worth over $1 billion to the Gates
Foundation in 2010, but because of the 20 percent of AGI deduction cap for charitable
contributions of stock to private foundations under section 170(b)(1)(D), and because Buffett
has a rather low AGI compared to his total earnings (thanks to the long-term capital gains and
qualified dividends tax rates), Buffet’s deduction was limited to the same amount he could have
deducted had he donated $13 million, rather than over $1 billion. See Laura Saunders, What Did
Warren Buffett Really Earn?, TOTAL RETURN BLOG, WALL ST. J. (October 19, 2011, 10:45
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/totalreturn/2011/10/19/what-did-warren-buffett-really-earn.
212 See Strom, supra note 199 (reporting the conversion of the Pew Charitable Trust to a
public charity); David Bank, Pew Casts Itself in Fresh Role as a Public Lobby, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 6, 2003, at D5 (discussing Pew’s intent to influence public issues).
213 I.R.C. § 509(a)(3).
207 Treas.
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inevitably do quell some useful advocacy, but the dangers of selfish
lobbying do present a real risk. This may be another situation where
simplification, transparency, and education rather than a substantive
change in the law offers the best solution.
2. Churches
The reason for excluding churches214 from the list of organizations
eligible to elect the Expenditure Test under section 501(h) is
somewhat less transparent and necessary from a policy perspective.
Such ineligibility was noted in the Senate Finance Committee Report
as a response to the “specific request” of “a number of churches,” 215
and has been similarly described by commentators.216 Apparently,
religious organizations lobbied to be excluded from 501(h) eligibility
out of fear that some of their members would make the election and
weaken their argument that the U.S. Constitution prohibits
governmental restrictions on their legislative activity.217 The churches
always lose this argument, and a body of law has developed through
the courts confirming that churches and their affiliates are subject to
the limitations on legislative activity imposed under the Code and
elsewhere.218 Thus, excluding churches and their affiliates from
making the section 501(h) election serves no purpose to the
community that lobbied for the exclusion.
Barring churches from eligibility to elect under section 501(h) is
helpful neither to the churches nor to society, as the former could
more easily further their charitable purposes under the Expenditure
Test and the latter could benefit from the increased legislative
discourse that churches could provide under the Expenditure Test. To
increase the voices impacting our nation’s public policy, Congress
should repeal section 501(h)(5) to allow churches to elect the
214 The term “church” in this context includes an integrated auxiliary of a church or of a
convention or association of churches and their affiliates. I.R.C. § 501(h)(5).
215 S. REP. NO. 94–938, pt. 2, at 84 (1976).
216 See James H. Nix, Limitations on the Lobbying of Section 501(c)(3) Organizations—A
Choice for the Public Charities, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 407, 415–416 (1979) (citing a House report
for the same proposition).
217 See Christian Echoes Nat’l Ministry, Inc., v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 856–68 (10th
Cir. 1972) (addressing and rejecting Constitutional arguments of religious organization
challenging the ability of the government to restrict its legislative activity); Branch Ministries v.
Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (same). FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 134, at
497.
218 To make a First Amendment Free Exercise claim, a church would need to show that the
restrictions unduly burden its free exercise rights. Courts have found that the sole effect of the
loss of the tax exemption will be to decrease the amount of money available to the Church for
its religious practices, and the Supreme Court has declared that such a burden “is not
constitutionally significant.” Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493
U.S. 378, 391 (1990) (citation omitted).
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Expenditure Test. If, as suggested later,219 the Expenditure Test
becomes the default test for legislative activity rather than the elective
test, that might make the test more politically palatable for churches.
B. Eliminate the $1 Million Cap and Regressive Sliding Scale
If lobbying restrictions must continue to plague charities, the $1
million cap on lobbying expenditures and the regressive sliding scale
should be vanquished. In 1976, when the caps were set,220 perhaps $1
million was a lot of money, but it is not so much money today.221 And
though an organization with a $17 million budget might have been
large and fairly rare in 1976, today a significant number of eligible
charities’ budgets are at or surpass $17 million. While many charities
can lobby well within the 501(h) dollar limits in the twenty-first
century, some charities inevitably will want to take lobbying to the
next level. The $1 million cap for the lobbying nontaxable amount
and the $1.5 million cap for the lobbying ceiling amount222 are way
too low to accommodate non-web lobbying activities by any sizable
organization, and the regressivity of the sliding scale cuts out too
many organizations that might be able to make a difference in the
world with their legislative efforts. And since these larger
organizations are likely to spend more on lobbying under either test,
the IRS should appreciate the more specific data from these
organizations that would be delivered under 501(h).223
First, to the extent that Congress continues to restrict lobbying
with an Expenditure Test, the caps should be increased at least to
reflect inflation since 1976. This would increase the Lobbying
Nontaxable Amount cap to approximately $4 million and the
Lobbying Ceiling cap (the more important cap) to $6 million.224
Second, regressivity should be abandoned because there is no
219 See

infra Part IV.E.
Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94–455, § 1307, 90 Stat. 1520 (1976).
221 $1 million in 2012 has the same buying power as $249,930.82 had in 1976. CPI
Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm
(last visited Apr. 6, 2012); see generally Overview of BLS Statistics on Inflation and Prices,
BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., http://www.bls.gov/bls/inflation.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012)
(providing an overview of the methodology used to calculate inflation).
222 See I.R.C. § 501(h)(1)(A), (2)(B) (2006) (providing that an exemption shall not be
revoked unless an electing charity spends more than the “lobbying ceiling amount,” which is
defined as 150 percent of the “lobbying nontaxable amount,” the maximum of which is $1
million).
223 This was one congressional goal in enacting I.R.C. § 501(h). See supra note 82 and
accompanying text (noting this purpose).
224 CPI
Inflation
Calculator,
BUREAU
OF
LAB.
STAT.,
http://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2012). Thanks to Professor
Ellen Aprill for this suggestion.
220 Tax
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particular reason to force charities with significant budgets into the
fuzzy and unhelpful Substantial Part Test. The law should aim for a
constant percentage of an organization’s exempt purpose expenditures
that does not top out at a specified capped amount.
C. Eliminate the Distinction Between Direct and Grassroots
Lobbying
The lower cap for grassroots lobbying225 as compared to direct
lobbying is irrational and should be repealed. If caps survive, there
should be one cap to cover all lobbying. If there is a rationale for any
distinction in caps, grassroots lobbying should be subject to a higher,
rather than lower, cap than direct lobbying. The lower cap on
grassroots lobbying makes it more likely that charities will get into
trouble by lobbying the public than by lobbying the government. This
result makes little sense from either a practical perspective or a policy
perspective. As a practical matter, grassroots lobbying may be more
costly than direct lobbying, which suggests that a higher rather than
lower cap should be available to make grassroots lobbying
meaningful and effective. On the policy side, grassroots lobbying
connects charities to the public, which seems more aligned with the
purposes of a public charity, which also suggests that the lower cap
on grassroots lobbying is unjustified. Furthermore, calculating two
different limitations is unnecessarily burdensome and complex.226
Legislative history to the 1976 legislation that implemented the
distinct limitations on grassroots and overall lobbying expenditures
did not elucidate any clear rationale for the distinction, other than
some sort of nebulous fear that charities might create a “slush fund”
for that purpose.227 Ill-fated legislation introduced in both the
House228 and the Senate229 in 2003 would have eliminated the
separate limitation on grassroots lobbying but the legislation did not
pass. The elimination of the lobbying distinction, however, was not
controversial, and the failure of the bills was unrelated to that
provision. The Joint Committee on Taxation also has recommended
eliminating the separate caps on overall and grassroots lobbying,
stating that “there is no significant policy rationale for the separate
limitations on grass-roots lobbying.”230 For both the practical and the
225 I.R.C.

§ 4911(c)(4).
Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, supra note 200 (discussing the complexity of

226 Exempt

the rules).
227 See supra notes 114–120 and accompanying text (discussing this legislative history).
228 H.R. 7, 108th Cong. § 206 (2003).
229 S. 476, 108th Cong. § 303 (2003).
230 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., STUDY ON THE OVERALL STATE
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policy reasons mentioned above, the separate limitation on grassroots
lobbying should be eliminated, and charities electing under 501(h)
should be permitted to spend their entire nontaxable and ceiling
amounts lobbying the public if they so choose.
D. Other Corrections
Two other changes to current law have been suggested by the
American Bar Association Tax Section that would improve the
operation of the Expenditure Test. First, section 4911(f), dealing with
the application of the lobbying limits to affiliated organizations, 231
should be deleted because the provision is “a complex and
unnecessary trap for the unwary.”232 Second, the Code should be
amended to remove section 501(h)(7)233 because “the IRS has not
developed a separate set of rules for non-electing organizations and
has no plans to do so.”234 These changes are sensible and will reduce
complexity for charities wishing to engage in the legislative process.
E. Make the Expenditure Test the Default Test
If the above amendments are made to the Expenditure Test, the
restrictive impact and complex implementation of the Expenditure
Test would be reduced, and charities would be more willing and able
to generate policy reform and improve legislative discourse. The
benefits of the Expenditure Test over the Substantial Part Test would
be more marked even than under current law. Accordingly, the final
suggestion is to make the Expenditure Test the default provision,
eliminating the Substantial Part Test or making it the opt-in provision.
If public charities are subject to restrictions on lobbying activity, they
deserve clarity and bright lines.

OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO
SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, VOLUME II:
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION TO SIMPLIFY THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM 455 (Joint Comm. Print 2001); see also Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA
Tax Section, supra note 200; TAX POLICY AND ADVOCACY EXPERTS SYMPOSIUM MEETING
SUMMARY
(Apr.
14–15,
2011),

https://www.independentsector.org/uploads/Policy_PDFs/SummaryNotesApril14152011ISTaxandPolicyExpertsMeeting.pdf.
231 I.R.C. § 4911(f) (2006).
232 Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, supra note 200.
233 I.R.C. § 501(h)(7).
234 Exempt Orgs. Comm., ABA Tax Section, supra note 200.
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CONCLUSION
The restrictions placed on the legislative activities of charities are
overly complex and under affective. The policies for promoting rather
than limiting legislative activity by charities are compelling, and
neither the legislative history to the 1934 limits nor the legislative
history to the 1976 limits shed light on any rationale for the
restrictions imposed. Furthermore, thirty-five years after the
Expenditure Test was enacted, most charities electing the Expenditure
Test under section 501(h) can lobby extensively, provided that the
organization is well-counseled to take advantage of lenient rules and
definitions under the election and employs inexpensive and free
methods of lobbying. In the twenty-first century, the Expenditure Test
is outdated, hypertechnical, and ineffective. The vagueness of the
Substantial Part Test and the unnecessary complexity of the
Expenditure Test rather than any real limits imposed by the Code
suppress legislative activity by public charities. This suppression, in
turn, limits the unique benefits that public charities can provide to
society by increasing debate and diversifying the voices in legislative
discourse. In light of these potential but unrealized benefits of
increased lobbying by the charitable sector, section 501(c)(3) should
be amended to permit unlimited legislative activity by all public
charities. If Congress will not enact that amendment, as a distant
second choice, the Expenditure Test should be improved and
simplified and should serve as the default test for legislative activities
of public charities.

